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ABSTRACT. We propose an allocation mechanism for publicly providing a private 
good such that the final allocation is simultaneously independent of income and 
increasing in strength of preference or need.  The “pay or wait” mechanism consists of 
offering the good for sale at two outlets.  The ‘queuing’ outlet would charge a low 
money price per unit, but high waiting timer per unit.  The ‘pricing’ outlet would 
charge a relatively high money price with rapid service.  High wage individuals will 
opt for the pricing outlet, and low wage individuals the queuing outlet.  If the policy 
maker stocks the outlets in proportion to the distribution of high and low wage earners 
in the population, consumers of both wages will purchase the same amount on 
average, while those who value the good more relative to other goods will receive 
more of it.  These outcomes are at risk if the good can be privately resold, but may be 
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1.  Introduction 
 
  When it comes to society’s concern over consumption inequality, some goods 
are more equal than others.  As Tobin observed in 1970, our general acceptance of 
inequality is tempered for those commodities ‘essential to life and citizenship,’ such 
as early education, emergency health care, voting, government services, food in times 
of crisis, park or beach access, and so on.  Traditionally, economists have been wary 
of distributional concerns over specific private goods (‘paternalism’), and of the 
public provision of such goods for redistributive purposes.  It was commonly argued 
that distributional concerns motivated by utilitarian social welfare could be met at 
least cost by redistributing income from rich to poor, and then allowing market prices 
to allocate resources to their most valued uses (the Second Welfare Theorem).   
  Nonetheless, two changes since 1970 have increased the attention economists 
have paid to public in-kind provision.  First, good-specific distributional concerns 
have proved sufficiently robust over time that some economists suggest they be taken 
seriously as public policy objectives (Weitzman, 1977; Rosen, 2002, p. 175).  For 
example, compulsory public health insurance in Canada, implemented federally in 
1968, was reviewed in 2002 and justified in part on the basis that Canadians want the 
poor to have the same access to health care as the rich (Romanow Commission, 2002, 
p. xvi).  Tobin (1970) was the first to characterize such non-welfarist objectives as 
specific egalitarianism.  Rationing scarce health services by queues rather than price 
seems acceptable from this view, because time is more equally distributed than 
earnings ability or wealth (Nichols, Smolensky and Tideman, 1971). 
  A second change within economics leading to a focus on in-kind provision has 
been the incorporation of imperfect information into standard welfare economics.   
Goods like health insurance may not be available to all in private markets if providers 
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cannot distinguish high and low risk individuals.  Government provision of uniform 
compulsory insurance may thus be welfare-improving (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976).  
Similarly, charities or governments may create a ‘samaritan’s dilemma’, or form of 
moral hazard where individuals correctly anticipate that if they under-invest in 
precautionary goods when young, they will be rescued from bad outcomes later in 
life.  Thus people under-save and under-insure (Bruce and Waldman, 1991).  Most 
importantly, governments may be unable to distinguish high from low ability workers, 
and thus face restrictions on the degree of redistribution possible through optimally 
designed tax systems. This is because individuals with high ability may mimic those 
with low ability in order to avoid taxes or qualify for cash transfers (Blackorby and 
Donaldson, 1988; Boadway and Marchand, 1995; and Blomquist and Christiansen, 
1997).  Unknown risk, moral hazard, and unknown ability have all been used to 
identify conditions under which social welfare could be higher if certain private goods 
were publicly provided at a uniform level to all.    
  Our paper draws on both of the above considerations to propose an in-kind 
redistributive mechanism that recognizes self-selection constraints for high and low 
ability individuals.  The redistributive objective we consider is commodity-specific 
egalitarianism.  Specific target goods such as elective health care, government 
services, secondary disaster relief, or access to national parks or campgrounds could 
be made available through parallel outlets that ration by different combinations of 
price and time.  A policy maker, by choosing the allocation of the good and its money 
(or time) price across outlets, can ensure that individuals self-select outlets by their 
earnings ability.  Those with a relatively high earnings ability will choose outlets that 
ration more by paying than by waiting, and vice versa.  Under conditions we identify, 
our mechanism can achieve specific egalitarianism, ensuring that individuals with a 
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given strength of preference for the target good will purchase the same amount 
regardless of income, while those who value it more highly relative to other goods 
will purchase more than those who value it less.   
  Of course, any use of time as an allocation device involves the waste of an 
otherwise valuable resource.  There is then inescapably an efficiency cost to the ‘pay 
or wait’ redistribution mechanism we propose. It is beyond the scope of this paper to 
compare the tradeoff between equity and efficiency achieved by this mechanism with  
that achieved by more traditional tax and transfer systems under imperfect 
information.  Rather, we focus on the distributional properties that a ‘pay or wait’ 
mechanism can achieve, with and without the potential for private resale.  We note 
heuristically how efficiency costs can be minimized, and refer interested readers to 
Clark and Kim (2005) for greater detail.
1   
  The layout of the paper is as follows.  Section 2 provides a brief review of the 
literature on the distributional and efficiency aspects of queuing as a redistributive 
mechanism.  Section 3 provides a formal model of our allocation mechanism, with 
and without the potential for resale, and with the introduction of preference 
heterogeneity.   We conclude in Section 4. 
 
2.  Waiting for Godot   
  As noted by Nichols et al. (1971), Barzel (1974), O’Shaughnessy (2000), and 
Alexeev and Leitzel (2001), allocating goods that are deemed essential to citizenship 
or life using queues rather than price can seem appealing in an egalitarian sense, 
because time is more evenly distributed than human or physical capital, or income. 
  Economists, in contrast, have criticized queuing on two major efficiency 
grounds.  First, buyers who wait in line are surrendering a valuable resource, time, 
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that unlike money does not get transferred to the seller.  The opportunity cost of that 
time includes not just leisure, but forgone production. Thus, widespread queuing for  
goods in an economy would ultimately make fewer of these goods available.   
Secondly, the time price of queuing penalizes those with a higher opportunity cost of 
time.  When compared to money pricing, queuing will thus transfer goods from some 
who value them more to others who value them less (Tobin, 1970; Suen, 1989; and 
O’Shaugnessy, 2000).  Far better to meet distributional concerns at a general level 
with a tax and transfer system, and then allocate private goods by price and 
congestible public services with user fees set at marginal social cost. 
  As previously pointed out, however, imperfect information means that tax and 
transfer systems carry their own distortions in work disincentives (Tobin, 1970; 
Bucovetsky, 1984) and imperfect targeting (Alexeev and Leitzel, 2001).  Similarly, 
user fees for congestible public services may have regressive distributional effects 
(Nichols et al., 1971).  In response, a number of studies have compared the efficiency 
of alternative re-distributional instruments, such as tax/transfers, in-kind transfers, 
queuing, or rationing with resale (Bucovetsky, 1984; Sah, 1987; Blackorby and 
Donaldson, 1988; Polterovich, 1993; O’Shaugnessy, 2000; and Alexeev and Leitzel, 
2001).  In general, if re-sale is not practical, the inefficiency of queuing must be 
traded-off against the inefficiency of allocating uniform quantities of a good to 
heterogeneous people.        
 Alternatively,  Nichols  et al. (1971) had a key insight that if people could 
choose whether to pay by money or by time, much of the re-distributional potential of 
allocation by time could be preserved, and its inefficiency reduced.  Indeed, private 
firms with a degree of monopoly power commonly sell goods using a menu of price / 
wait combinations as a form of second degree price discrimination to increase profits 
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(Tirole, 1988).  Governments could do the same with a target good of interest, but to 
pursue distributional ends such as specific egalitarianism.  Low wage individuals 
would self-select to pay by time, while those with a high wage would self-select to 
pay by money.  If wage captures the opportunity cost of time, and differences in 
wages reflect differences in marginal product, then the time lost in queues would have 
low foregone cost in wages and production.  The costly and error-prone apparatus of 
means testing individuals would be unnecessary.   
  While Nichols et al. (1971) provided no formal model of parallel markets,  
O’Shaugnessy (2000) and Alexeev and Leitzel (2001) have when comparing social 
welfare under such systems with that under conventional tax and transfer systems.   
Both of these studies consider general equilibrium production economies in which 
households value leisure and a single consumption good.  Households may purchase 
the consumption good either at a subsidized price with a queue, or at a higher free 
market price without a queue.  O’Shaugnessy (2000) finds that the tradeoff between   
mean consumption and its inequality may be better under differential pricing than a 
tax and welfare system.  However, the tradeoff between mean utility and its inequality 
would favour the tax and welfare system.  In contrast, Alexeev and Leitzel (2001) find 
that the tradeoff between mean utility and its inequality may favour parallel markets 
over lump sum taxes and transfers when the latter are imperfectly targeted.   
Interestingly, both papers find that parallel markets gain an advantage over tax and 
transfers as the social planner increases the weight on inequality relative to mean 
consumption (O’Shaugnessy) or income (Alexeev and Leitzel). 
  Our approach differs from O’Shaugnessy (2000) and Alexeev and Leitzel 
(2001) in that we ask whether parallel markets can achieve the particular 
distributional objective of specific egalitarianism, or that the consumption of a target 
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good be independent of income, but dependent on strength of preference.  We thus 
divide their models’ single consumption good into a target good, and a remaining 
composite commodity over which society has no distributional concerns.  We also 
differ in allowing preference or need for the target good to vary across the population.  
Finally, we differ in allowing the policy maker the extra degree of freedom of setting 
a money price in both parallel outlets, and through this the ability to create or preclude 
queuing in the outlet targeted to the rich.         
 
3.  Our model          
  Consider an economy of   people who have preference orderings over 
leisure , a composite commodity
N
l y , and a good g targeted by the government.  We 
will assume that people’s preferences can be represented by a constant elasticity of 
substitution (CES) utility function
2, and initially that they are identical: 
  ()
1
(,, ) Uy G y g
ρρ ρ ρ θ =+ + ll   ,                     (1) 
whereθ  represents an individual’s strength of preference for the target good relative 
to the other goods.  Rho (ρ ) is a positive monotonic transformation of the person’s 
elasticity of substitution between the target and other goods, ranging from perfect 
flexibility (ρ  = 1), to Cobb Douglas (ρ  = 0), to Leontief (ρ  = - ∞).
3  As we shall 
see, the value of rho plays a key role in determining how differences in income affect 
people’s time allocation decisions.   
  The price of leisure is a person’s wage, w, while the price of y is normalized to 
1.  The full money and time price of the target good at a given outlet is Pg = wH + p, 
where p is the money unit price, and H is the waiting time required per unit of g 
purchased.
4  We assume initially that g cannot feasibly be resold once purchased.  All 
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individuals have an identical time endowment, T, which they can spend working L, in 
leisure ℓ, or in line (Hg).  We assume that all income comes from labour, but do not 
explicitly model the allocation of labour hours to the production of y and g.  Instead, 
we take the supply of g as exogenous at M.
5   
For ease of exposition, we shall start by assuming that g is available from only 
one outlet, with no potential for resale, and that all individuals face the same wage w.  
An individual’s problem is:    
            ()
1
,,, Ly g Max U y g
ρρ ρ ρ θ =+ +
l l     
 s.t.    wL pg y = + ,                           (2) 
  ,  TL H =++ l g
                         .  0 L ≥
With interior solutions for any ρ  ∈ (-∞,1), the corresponding supply and demand 
functions are: 
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            Consider now the outlet for the target good, with a fixed supply of the target 
good, M.  The technical conditions are satisfied to ensure that there exists a unique 




                            (4) 
* Ng M =
Note that since it is the full price
*
g P  =
* wH p
* + which clears the outlet, the policy 
maker has freedom to set a negative, zero, or positive money price
* p ≤
*
g P , and let the 
per unit queuing time   ( ) adjust to satisfy (4).   Alternatively, the policy maker 
can set a target non-negative per unit queuing time and let the money 
price
* H 0 ≥
* H
* p adjust to satisfy (4).  We shall primarily frame our discussion, however, in 
terms of money price setting.  
3.1 The isoprice line 
 
  The policy maker could set the money price just high enough to enable the 
market for the target good to clear without any queue, or 
**
g p Pp = .  We label this ‘pure 
pricing.’  In contrast, the policy maker could set the money price at zero, causing the 
market to clear by ‘pure queuing’ at 
*
g P = .   Between these extremes, the money 





p p , resulting in an 




  and full price  .  
Finally, the money price could be set at a negative level as a unit subsidy, , 
requiring even greater equilibrium queuing time than under pure queuing.  In 
equilibrium, this negative money price would be constrained at the p
**
g Pw Hp =+
* 0 p <
min below which 
each individual would if possible supply negative labour hours and ‘purchase g for a 




min () g pP
* ρ ρ θ
− − =− , which would have a 
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= .  Following Nichols et 
al. (1971), let us mark these various equilibrium money/time price pairs in (,) H p  
space in Fig.1. 





g P  that satisfies (4) and clears the market.  For an individual 
with wage , these  combinations form an isoprice line  w
** (, Hp )
* **
g p Pw H =− with 
slope -w.  This person would pay the same full price at any point on the isoprice line, 
a higher full price at (,) H p  combinations above it, and a lower full price at (,) H p  
combinations below it. 
To introduce income inequality, we first examine the effect of an increase in 
the (uniform) wage on the position of the isoprice line for a person at a sole outlet.  
Consider first the intercepts.  At the pure pricing intercept
**
g p Pp = , we differentiate 
(4) with respect to w.  This yields 


























− ⎜⎟ ∂ − ⎝⎠ =
∂ ⎡⎤ ⎛⎞
+− ⎢⎥ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ − ⎢⎥ ⎝⎠ ⎣⎦
1 ρ −
  .                 (5) 








 for all values of ρ ∈ (-∞, 1).  Thus, under pure 
pricing, a wage increase for all individuals would cause demand for g to shift right, 
raising the money price needed to clear the market.   
At the pure queuing intercept
*
g P  = , differentiating (4) yields 
*
q wH




** 1 11 1
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  10                            
 
p (money 
rice of g)  p  
 
 
      
        
        
        
        
        
       
              0          
                    H (time price of g) 
 
 




Fig. 1.  A market-clearing isoprice line for a single outlet and wage group 
 
 
























forρ <0.  That is, if the outlet clears only by queuing, a higher wage would 
lower the equilibrium time price if the elasticity of substitution between goods were 
high (ρ>0), but raise it if that elasticity were low (ρ<0).  Intuitively, this is because a 
higher wage has an income effect that makes people demand more of all goods, 
including the target good.  But a higher wage also raises the opportunity cost of the 
target good when purchased only with time (as it does leisure), creating a substitution 
effect towards labour and y and away from demand for the target good or leisure.  The 
income effect of a wage increase dominates the substitution effect when 0 ρ < , 
causing net demand for the target good to rise, and the equilibrating time price to rise.  
The two effects exactly offset when 0 ρ = , leaving net demand and equilibrating time 
price unchanged. Finally, the substitution effect of a wage increase dominates the 











** (where ) qg wH P =
*
min p
  11                            
income effect when 0 ρ > , causing net demand for the target good to fall, and the 
equilibrating time price to fall.   
3.2 Two outlets without resale 
  Returning to our isoprice line in Fig.1, we can now predict the effect of 
raising everyone’s wage from w (redefined as ) to L w
H w .  For ρ > 0, the signs of the 
partial derivatives in (5) and (6) and the steeper slope imply that an individual’s 
isoprice line of market-clearing(,) H p  combinations will rotate clockwise around a 
point in the positive quadrant, as shown in Fig. 2.  For ρ < 0, the signs of (5) 
and (6) and the steeper slope imply that the isoprice line will rotate clockwise around 
a point in the negative quadrant, as shown in Fig. 3.  More precisely, the 
new isoprice line will cross the original so long as its lower bound 
** ** (, Hp )
)
)
** ** (, Hp
**
,, (, H max H min Hp 
lies to the southwest of . This will indeed occur, as can be seen by 
returning to the definitions of 
**
,, (, Lm a x Lm i n Hp )
*
max H  and   at zero labour supply.  If   is held 

















< .        (7)   
Similarly, if 
*



































<   .        (8) 
  With a slight change of interpretation, we can use Figs 2 or 3 to introduce 
multiple income groups and outlet choice to our model.  Suppose that there are two 
income groups, with NL individuals earning a wage wL, and NH = N – NL individuals 
earning a wage wH, where H L ww > .
7  To achieve equal consumption of g , the policy 
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Fig. 2.  Isoprice lines for two wage levels, ρ  > 0  
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Fig. 3.  Isoprice lines for two wage levels, ρ < 0 
 
maker could create two outlets where the target good is available.  For the moment, 
we continue to assume that resale is not possible. 
  At a ‘queuing’ outlet, the policy maker would set a lower money price, L p , to 
attract the poor, while at a ‘pricing’ outlet he would set a higher money price,  H p , to 
attract the rich.  The policy maker must distribute the supply of the target good M 
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=  .        (9)  
If the poor and rich self-select to their respective outlets, each outlet will clear 
according to its own version of (4).  With supply at each outlet pre-set in proportion to 
distribution of earner types as in (9), the isoprice lines of rich and poor at each outlet 
will differ only in wage.  Their isoprice lines will then cross under the same 
conditions as in our thought experiment for a single outlet in Figs 2 or 3. 
  At the queuing outlet, the policy maker is free to set the money 
price L p anywhere between and
*
,min L p
** p .  For example, it could be set at zero when ρ 




























= ⎟ .                         (10) 
At maximum,  L p  could be set at the unique   combination that would 
simultaneously clear a proportionately stocked queuing outlet with poor people or a 
proportionately stocked pricing outlet with rich people, 
** ** (, Hp )
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p .                                
  The policy maker has similar flexibility in setting the money price at the 
pricing outlet.  At maximum,  H p  could be set to clear the outlet without queuing 
when only rich people are in it, or the 
*
pH p  where 



























8                    (12) 
At minimum  H p  could be set at the 
** p  already defined in (11).     
  Before presenting our results, we describe finally how individuals choose 
between the queuing and pricing outlets to purchase the target good. An individual 
will choose the outlet that offers the lowest full price given his wage. With CES 
utility, the composition of that full price will affect the individual’s time allocation 
between work and queuing, but not his demand for leisure. More formally, the 
individual’s demand functions given in (3) are conditional on his choice of outlet.  
Substituting these into utility yields indirect utility         
() () () ( )
1
1 1
** * * * * 11 1 1 1, w h e r e   gg Vy gP w w T P w H
ρ
ρρ ρ ρ ρρ ρ ρ ρρ ρρ θθ
−
−− − − ⎛⎞
=++ = + + = + ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
l
* p .    (13) 
It follows that for any ρ ∈(-∞,1),  * ˆ *
g g P VV > % P
* if and only if 
* ˆ
g g PP < %.  We now have 
sufficient background to present our results. 
 
Proposition 1  Suppose a society has two income levels, and a target good for which 
resale is not possible.  If a policy maker creates two outlets, distributes the target good 
proportionally as in (9), and chooses money prices 
**
,min () LL
* p pp ≤≤  and 
** * () H pH p pp ≤≤  such that H L p p ≠ , he will induce a unique separating equilibrium 
where the rich choose the pricing outlet, and the poor choose the queuing outlet. 
 
Proof  See  Appendix  1                  
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The intuition for Proposition 1 can be grasped easily from Fig. 2 or Fig. 3.  Suppose 
the policy maker chooses a L p for the queuing outlet that corresponds to point A on a 
poor person’s isoprice line, and a H p  for the pricing outlet that corresponds to point B 
on a rich person’s isoprice line (in either Figure).  This will create a separating 
equilibrium, because a poor person who switched from A to B would face an (,) H p  
combination that posed a higher full price given his low wage.  Conversely, a rich 
person who switched from B to A would face an (,) H p  combination that would pose 
a higher full price given his high opportunity cost of time.   
  Once we have established that the rich and poor separate, it is easy to show 
that they purchase the same quantity of the target good. 
 
Proposition 2  The separating equilibrium above equalizes consumption of the target 
good between rich and poor. 
 
Proof  With money prices set by the policy maker, the queuing time at the pricing and 
queuing outlets adjust such that  
   and 
*
LL q Ng M =
*
H Hp Ng M = .                         (14) 












  , and                    (15) 











 .                          
 
Propositions 1 and 2 show that a policy maker can accommodate two wage groups at 
two outlets with flexibility in setting money prices.  Note that the degree of the policy 
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maker’s flexibility depends on the extent of the wage disparity between the two 
groups.  Holding wL constant, an increase in wH would rotate the high wage isoprice 
line clockwise, either in the positive ( 0 ρ > ) or negative ( 0 ρ < ) quadrants.  This in 
turn would decrease
** H and raise
** p , and increase the range of money prices that the 
policy maker could choose for both income groups while preserving separation.
9  In 
particular, a decrease in 
** H  would allow the policy maker to set  so as to lessen 
the time the poor must spend in queues. 
L p
Of course, queuing time and its associated waste will be minimized if both 
outlet’s money prices are set at their maximum possible values,
** p and 
*
pH p .  On the 
other hand, if the policy maker is willing to tolerate having both income groups 
queue, it turns out that he can achieve the same equal allocation of g using one outlet 
rather than two.  To do so, he must set the single money price at the unique level 
identified in (11). 
 
Proposition 3  There exists a pooled outlet with a unique   at which both 
income groups face the same full price and consumption of 
** ** (, Hp )
g  as at the separating 
equilibrium. 
 
Proof:  if the proportional allocation of the target good is combined in a single outlet 
that charges  , a low income person will face the same full price at the 
pooled outlet as he did at the separating one 
(
** ** (, Hp )
* * ** ** * *
, L g wg L L L L PP w H p w H ≡= + = + L p ).  This means he will be indifferent between 
the two equilibria, and still demand 
*
L g  = M/N.  The high income person will also face 
the same full price at the pooled and separating outlets 
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(
** * * * * *
, H
*
g wg H H H H PP w H p w H ≡= + = + H p ), be indifferent between them, and 
demand 
*
H g  = M/N.  The pooled outlet will clear, as 
  NL 
*
L g + NH
*
H g  = NL (M/N) + NH(M/N) = M .                (16) 
 
  To summarize, we have shown that when resale of a target good is not 
feasible, a policy maker can make its consumption independent of income by inducing 
different money and time prices for different income groups.  We next examine the 
consequences for this mechanism’s distributional outcome if the good can be resold.  
3.3  Two outlets with resale 
A potential problem with differential pricing emerges if the mechanism is 
applied to a good that can be resold.  As illustrated by the vertical intercepts of the 
isoprice lines in Figs. 2 or 3, the (pure pricing equivalent) full price of g at the 
separating equilibrium without resale is higher for the rich,
*
H g w P than for the 
poor,
*
L g w P .  If resale were feasible, such price differences would provide high wage 
individuals the incentive to bypass the pricing outlet, and offer an intermediate price 
pb to low wage individuals to resell the good.
 10  Taking some g purchased from the 
queuing outlet and reselling it to the rich could provide the poor with a higher utility 
than retaining it for own consumption, making both parties to the transaction better 
off. However specific egalitarianism would no longer be achieved, as final 
consumption of g would be higher among the rich than the poor.  We pose the 
problem more formally below, adapting the resale model of Stahl and Alexeev (1985), 
and propose an approach the policy maker could take to preserve specific 
egalitarianism when resale is feasible.     
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 To  characterize  resale market equilibrium, we first define gb,i as the quantity of 
the target good that is traded by an individual of wage i in a resale market.  For low 
wage individuals who sell in the resale market, gb,L ≤ 0.  For high wage individuals 
who buy in the resale market, gb,H ≥ 0.   , () L bL gg − is then defined as the total quantity 
of the target good purchased by a low wage individual at the queuing outlet, 
while , () H bH gg − is the quantity of the target good purchased by a high wage 
individual at the pricing outlet.  Reselling units of the target good at pb provides the 








≡ .  While the policy maker may pre-
commit to a money or time price at each outlet, we assume for convenience that he 
sets the latter at  , and allows the money prices to 
equilibrate.
** * *
,max (, LL H HH H H ≤< = 0 )
11  An individual’s problem, conditional on choice of outlet, becomes 
            ()
1
,,, ii i Ly g Max U y g
ρρ ρ ρ θ =+ +
l l     
 s.t.    ,                              (17)  ,, () ii bb i i i b i i wL pg p g g y −=− +
  , () iii i ib i TL H g g = ++ − l , 
                         ,                     i = L, H .  , 0,( ) 0 ii b i Lg g ≥− ≥




























































, 1 HH g H Dw P
ρρ
ρ ρρ θ
− −− =+ + , and  , g H Pp H = .  Note that H p  may differ from the 
case without resale.  For low wage individuals, the corresponding supply and demand 
functions are: 
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,, 1 bL b L b gL Dw w p P
1
1 ρ ρρ θ
−− =+ +
− , and , g LLL Pp w H L = + .  Note that the 
introduction of an effective wage induces low wage individuals to supply no 
labour in their prior jobs. 
b ww > L
Equilibrium here requires that the pricing, queuing and resale markets clear 
simultaneously, or that 
                     , () L Lb L Ng g M −= %% q ,                                  (20) 
                     , () H Hb H Ng g M −= %% p ,                 (21) 
                                                (22)  ,, 0. Lb L Hb H Ng Ng += %%




g w P >
*
H bL g wb g w g Pp P P == > %% % w .  This single resale market price  b p % 
eliminates arbitrage across markets, but compared to the case without resale, results in 
a lower full price for the rich and higher full price for the poor.   
More formally, the resale price  b p %cannot be less than the price at the queuing 
outlet 
b g wL b Pp w H ≡+ % % L % ) or the poor would purchase nothing there  , ( L bL gg − %%=0 and 
(20) would be violated.  The resale price  b p %similarly cannot be less than the price at 
the pricing outlet 
H g wH H Pp w H ≡+ % % H %
)
 or the rich would purchase nothing there 
, ( H bH gg − %%=0 and (21) would be violated.  Conversely, the resale price b p %cannot 
exceed the price at the queuing outlet,
b g w P % .  Low wage individuals would then seek 
to sell infinite quantities into the resale market.  Their time constraints would prevent 
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this, exerting downward pressure on   via the resale price until  b w b p %
b g w P = % .  
Similarly, the resale price  b p %cannot exceed the price at the pricing outlet 
H g w P % or 




g w P , which in turn is greater than 
*
L











) must exceed , giving the poor an incentive to sell into the resale 
market ( <0).  This would violate (22).  We thus have 
L w
, bL g %
H b g wb g Pp P == %% % w .   
To compare the equilibrium resale price to its level when resale was not 
possible, we assume that the policy maker fixes
*
L H at the same level with resale that 
they would have without resale.  We argue first that the equilibrium resale price 




g w P , or else the poor would not patronize the queuing outlet,   , () L bL gg − %%=0, 
and (20) would be violated.   b p % also cannot equal 
*
L
g w P , for then the poor would have 
no incentive to resell, and  = 0.  Yet if  , bL g % b p % is equal to 
*
L




g w P , then the rich would want to purchase more in total than without resale, or 
.  Given the unchanging supply in the pricing outlet, M / H gM N > % p, this can only be 
achieved if  >0, which would violate (22).  Thus  , bH g %
*
L bg w pP > % .  Finally, we argue 
that the equilibrium resale price b p %cannot equal or exceed the equilibrium pricing 
outlet price without resale, 
*
H
g w P , or else the rich would have no incentive to 
patronize the resale market and  =0.  With the poor selling into the resale market  , bH g %
  21                            
( , this would violate (22). Together this yields our results    , 0) bL g < %
*
H
g w P >
*
H bL g wb g w g Pp P P == > %% % w . 
The existence and uniqueness of these prices can be demonstrated as follows.  If 
b p %were as low as 
*
L g w P , there would be excess demand for g in the resale market.  In 
particular, high wage individuals would demand more than without resale (M/N), 
since 
*
L g w P < 
* .
H
g w P  Low wage individuals will demand for themselves the same 
quantity as under resale (M/N), and will have no incentive to purchase extra for resale.  
Thus total demand for g will exceed supply, or  LL HH q p Ng Ng M M M + >+= %% .  By 
comparing this to the addition of equations (20) and (21), it can be shown that 
.  Conversely, if  ,, 0 Lb L Hb H Ng Ng + %% > b p %were as high as 
*
H
g w P , there would be excess 
supply for g in the resale market.  For high wage individuals would demand  H g % =M/N 
as without resale, either using the resale market  >0 or not,  =0.  Positive 
purchase from the resale outlet  >0 would imply that 
, bH g % , bH g %
, bH g %
, () / / H bH p H gg M N M N −< = %% , which would violate (21).  Zero purchase,  =0, 
together with the positive supply in the resale market (
, bH g %
, 0) bL g < % shown in the 
paragraph above for  b p %=
*
H
g w P , would  imply ,, 0 Lb L Hb H Ng Ng + < %% .  The uniqueness 
of b p %follows from monotonicity of the demand functions for g.  
        It can be shown that at the equilibrium when resale is feasible, both rich and poor 
would prefer the market equilibrium with resale to the former allocation without 
resale.  For the poor, substituting the demand functions of (19) into the utility function 
will yield indirect utility  L V %.  It can be shown that  L V % > 
*
L V if and only if  
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% % % 0 ,                 (23) 
where  , bL D %  is as defined in (19).  The second expression in the parentheses in (23) is 














g w P <  b p %, and
*
L H and 
*
L p  are unchanged.   As  is negative, the 
combined product in (23) is positive.  Thus a low wage individual would prefer the 
equilibrium with resale.  For a high wage individual, substituting the demand 
functions of (18) into utility will yield 
, bL g %
H V %. It can be shown that
*
H H VV > %  if and only if 
               





H p = .                 (24) 
This inequality was seen to hold above. 
             Since demand for the target good is falling in full price, it also follows that a 
given high wage individual will consume more at the market equilibrium with resale 
than at the former allocation, or 
*
H H gg > % .  A given low wage individual, facing a 
higher opportunity cost of retaining the target good, will consume less, or
*
L L gg < % .   It 
follows that the poor will consume less of the target good than the rich, or 
**
H HL gggg >=> %% L . 
  To preserve equal consumption of the target good when resale is feasible, we 
propose that the policy maker could structure sales so as to deliberately create 
transactions costs for either buyers or sellers who enter the resale market.  For 
example, managers of campsites at popular national parks could mimic airlines by 
personalizing campsite passes with purchaser details.  These details could then be 
verified using ID when the passes are presented for use.  Those trying to use re-sold 
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passes must then forge or borrow ID, which requires additional time and money 
expense.   
  More formally, we denote the per unit money and time transactions costs 
created for low wage sellers or high wage buyers as fm,i and ft,i, respectively, where i = 
L,H. We assume these costs depend linearly on the volume of g resold, though they 
could easily be modelled as independent of (positive) volume also. The total per unit 
transactions costs for poor and rich in resale are then αL =  mL L tL f wf +  and αH   
= mH H tH f wf + , respectively. 
  The budget and time constraints of a low wage individual facing the option of 
resale with transactions costs are 
,, , () , L L b bL L L bL mL bL L wL pg p g g f g y −=− − + ,                           
                               (25) 
    ,, () , L L L L L bL tL bL TL H g g f =++ − − l g . 
Substituting the low wage individual’s resulting demand functions into his utility 
function, it can be shown that 
*
















% % % 0 B > ,                 (26) 













  .                       (27) 
The policy maker could try to impose sufficient total per unit transactions costs 
,min L α on low wage individuals seeking to resell units of the target good that the 
inequality in (27) would not hold.  Alternatively, if the transactions costs were 
imposed upon high wage individuals who could purchase g in the resale market, they 
would face budget and time constraints of   
  24                            
,, , () , H H b bH H H bH mH bH H wL pg p g g f g y −=− + + ,                           
                               (28) 
    ,, H HHt L b TL f =++ l L g
)
,  
 or a combined constraint of  
   ,, () ( ) ( H Hb H bH b HH H H pg g p g y wT α −+ + + ≤ − l .               (29) 
As can be seen by examining (29), a high wage individual will be better off 
purchasing at least some g in the resale market, or 
*
H H VV > %  if and only if 
      .                                 (30) 
*
bH pp α +< % H
Again the policy maker could try to impose sufficient total per unit transactions costs 
,min H α on high wage individuals seeking to purchase units of the target good from the 
resale market that the inequality in (30) would not hold.  In either case, specific 
egalitarianism can be preserved if the policy maker imposes sufficient transactions 
costs on those attempting to buy or sell the target good in a resale market. 
  Moving from the problem of resale to that of preference heterogeneity, we ask 
whether our mechanism can ensure that consumption will depend on relative strength 
of preference, even as it equalizes consumption across wage groups.  For simplicity of 
exposition, we return to the assumption that resale is infeasible.   
3.4  Heterogeneous preferences  
  People vary in their willingness-to-pay for a good because they differ in 
income, but also because they differ in relative strength of preference or need.  Our 
mechanism can respect the latter difference, rather than imposing an equal distribution 
of the good to all.  That is, we ask our mechanism to make consumption of the target 
good independent of income, but increasing in strength of preference.
12  
We introduce heterogeneous preferences by allowing that individuals may 
place a ‘regular’ θR or a ‘strong’ weight θS on the target good in utility in equation (1), 
  25                            
where 0<θR <θS.  Of NL low wage individuals, a proportion sL have θS weights, and (1-
) have θ L s R weights.  Of NH high wage individuals, sH have θS weights, and (1- sH) 
have θR weights.   
  As we showed in (13), individuals with any given strength of preference for 
the target good will choose between outlets based only on full price
*
g P .  It follows that 
individuals with differing θ’s but with an identical wage will choose the same outlet.  
Their isoprice lines will be identical in equilibrium, except that the lower bound for 
someone with high preference strength θS,  will lie north-west of the 
lower bound for someone withθ
**
,max ,min (, SS Hp )
) R,  .
**
,max ,min (, RR Hp
13  An example is provided in Fig. 5 
below, where the dotted segment at the bottom of the high wage isoprice line 
represents money and time price combinations that would be feasible for someone 
with θR ( ), but infeasible for someone with θ
*
, 0 HR L ≥ S.(
*
, 0 HS L < ). 
Note that with heterogeneity, the distribution of preferences among the people 
at an outlet will affect the full price that brings the outlet into equilibrium.   For 
example, if only low wage individuals inhabit an outlet with a supply of Mq, there will 
exist a unique
*
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             (31) 
Differentiating (31), it can be shown that 
* / g L Ps ∂ ∂ > 0.  Intuitively, an increase in the 
proportion of individuals with a strong preference for the target good at an outlet will 
bid up the (H, p) combinations that clear it.  This would shift out the isoprice line of 
an individual at that outlet, regardless of his preference strength.  
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  Let us return to the two outlet case from our previous discussion.  Would the 
high and low wage groups separate as before into ‘pricing’ and ‘queuing’ outlets 
offering high  H p  and low  L p  money prices?  Graphically, the isoprice lines for rich 
and poor must cross at an   combination that is feasible for all wage and 
preference types for a separating equilibrium to exist.  That is, the isoprice lines must 
cross at an  between (0, min{ }) so that the 
demand functions for the target good simultaneously satisfy 




, max , max , max , max ,,, LS LR HS HR HHHH
                               and  
**
,, (1 ) LL L R L L L S sN g s N g M −+ =
                               (32) 
                      
**
,, (1 ) H HH R H HH S p sN g s N g M −+ =  .            
At one extreme, separating equilibria would not exist if the proportion of the poor 
with a strong taste for g, sL, were too high relative to the analogous proportion of the 
rich,  sH.  For a given sH, the proportion sL cannot exceed an upper bound of 
for to remain nonnegative, as illustrated in Fig. 4.  Intuitively, the greater the 
proportion of strong preference people at an outlet, the greater its full price, making 
other outlets with more tepid patrons more attractive.  Thus, if s
max L s
** H
L were too high at the 
queuing outlet relative to sH at the pricing outlet, the isoprice lines would not 
intersect, and a marginal low wage person (of either preference strength) would prefer 
to switch to the pricing outlet.   
At the other extreme, separating equilibria would not exist if sL were too low 
relative to sH,, or less than the lower bound sL min.  This is because a sufficient fall in sL 
would shift the low wage isoprice line sufficiently inward to prevent the intersection 
of a low wage, high preference isoprice line with the high wage, high preference 
isoprice line.  A marginal high wage person would then prefer to switch to the 
queuing outlet. Assuming neither extreme occurs, we may present our results. 
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Fig. 4.  Maximum feasible range of   given  L s H s  
 
 
Proposition 4  Suppose a society has two wage levels and two relative strengths of 
preference for g, such that  ≤ s min L s L  ≤  for a given s max L s H..  If a policy maker creates 
two outlets, distributes the target good as in (9), and chooses money prices 
** *
,min () LL p pp ≤≤
** * ()  and H pH p pp ≤≤  where  H L p p ≠ , he will induce a unique 
separating equilibrium where the rich choose the pricing outlet, and the poor choose 
the queuing outlet. 
 
Proof: so long as ( ≤ s min L s L  ≤  ) given s max L s H, see Appendix 1 as before.          
 
We turn next to ask whether this separating equilibrium will make consumption of g 
independent of income, but increasing in strength of preference.  The queuing outlet 
will clear at the full price 
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which given proportional supply (9) can be expressed as 
              
**
,, (1 ) .
q





−+ = =                      (33) 
Similarly, the pricing outlet will clear at the full price 










−+ = =  .                     (34) 
Comparing (33) and (34), we see that the consumption of g is equalized across the 
average person of each income group.  That is, equality of consumption will hold 
between income groups, but it is not necessarily the case that and 
.  Intuitively, the problem is that the effect of preference strength on a 
person’s demand for the target good, 
**
,, LR HR gg =
**
, LS HS gg = ,
* / g θ ∂ ∂  depends on variables such as full price, 
income, and preference distribution, each of which may differ across outlets.  Thus, at 
the separating equilibrium, there is no reason to believe that individuals with a 
common θ  at different outlets will purchase identical quantities of . 
* g
  Fortunately, the equalization of average consumption across income groups 
places substantial constraints on inequality caused by income.  In particular, 
differences in preference strength will dominate differences in income.      
 
Proposition 5  Under the (income) separating equilibrium defined in Proposition 4, 
every individual with  S θ  will purchase more  g   than any individual with R θ . 
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  Finally, there will again be an equivalent pooled equilibrium at a single outlet 
that corresponds to our separating equilibrium.  As with homogeneous preferences, 
this occurs at the unique   where the isoprice line for individuals of each 
income group cross, as defined in (32).  The reasoning is analogous to the proof of 
Proposition 3, and is omitted. 
** ** (, Hp
  To summarize our results, a policy maker who cannot distinguish high and low 
wage individuals can use differential time and money pricing of a target good to make 
its consumption independent of wage (at least on average) yet dependent on strength 
of preference.  Queuing time among high wage individuals can be set to zero.   
Queuing time among low wage individuals is bounded below at the time price   at 
which isoprice lines.  If this queuing time were sufficiently high that the value of the 
good (θ) fell during the wait, the normative appeal of our separating equilibria might 
diminish, as g received now would be unequal to g received later.  A policy maker 
persevering with the mechanism might then have to set
** H
*
L p and 
*
H p  so as to limit the 
difference in queuing times so as to convince the poor to remain at the queuing 
outlet.
14   
3.5   Multiple outlets   
Thus far, our analysis has been restricted to binary classifications of income and 
preference type.  However, our results could readily be extended in a discrete 
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framework to any countable finite number of wage levels and preference strengths.  
Fig. 5, for example, illustrates how consumption could be equalized for four income 
groups (w1<w2<w3<w4) when resale is infeasible, preferences are homogeneous and ρ 
> 0.  The policy maker could use four outlets with respective money prices set within 
the ranges (p1<p2<p3<p4).  The money/time price pairs A, B, C and D  provide a 
sample separating equilibrium.
15   Using reasoning analogous to that for existence in 
Appendix 1, members of each wage group would find the full price lowest in their 
own outlet.  Alternatively, the policy maker could achieve equivalent allocations 




3,4 p ).  More generally, it is 
anticipated that K income groups could be accommodated with K separating outlets, 
or with the largest integer lower than or equal to K/2 pooled outlets. 
4.  Conclusion 
  In this paper, we have considered the problem of a policy maker with the in-
kind distributional objective of ‘specific egalitarianism,’ or that access to a target 
good be made independent of income, but increasing in preference or need.  This 
objective could result from good-specific distributional concerns in society at large, 
and the inability of the policy maker to distinguish high and low ability individuals in 
the standard tax and transfer system.  
  We described circumstances under which this objective could be achieved by 
making the good simultaneously available at parallel outlets charging different money 
and time prices.  In particular, with two income groups, a policy maker could allocate 
a fixed supply of the target good at two outlets in proportion to the income 
distribution, set a high money price at one, and a low (even negative) money price at 
the other.  Queuing time would equilibrate at each outlet.  Those with a high wage 
would choose the outlet with a high money price and little or no waiting, and those  
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Fig. 5.  Isoprice lines for four wage groups (ρ>0) 
 
with a low wage would choose the outlet with low money price and a substantial 
queue.  Alternatively, the policy maker could induce an equivalent pooled equilibrium 
in which both income groups would be served at a single outlet.  This equilibrium 
would feature a unique money and time price that each income group would find 
equivalent to the full price they would face at the separating equilibria.    
  We find that when resale is infeasible and preferences are homogeneous, our 
proposal exactly equalizes consumption of the target good across rich and poor. When 
preferences for the target good are heterogeneous, differential pricing equalizes the 
average consumption of the target good across income groups.  At the individual 
level, those with a higher strength of preference for the good will always receive more 
of it than those with a lower strength, regardless of income.   These results will hold 
so long as separating equilibria exist, which requires that the distribution of 
preferences for the target good not differ excessively between the rich and the poor.  
While differential pricing involves the allocative inefficiency of optional 
queuing, it has the advantage over uniform disbursement that differences in relative 
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preference orderings are respected.  The policy maker could minimize queuing time 
by setting separate money prices such that high wage individuals would pay purely by 
money, and low wage individuals would pay the highest money price consistent with 
keeping high wage individuals out of their outlet.   
  The informational requirements of differential allocation are modest; the 
policy maker must know a population’s income and preference distribution, but not an 
individual’s.  Even an exact knowledge of the preference distribution is not essential 
for separating equilibria, because the policy maker can set each outlet’s money price 
within a range and achieve the same distribution of the target good.         
Unfortunately, our mechanism suffers from several limitations. First, as 
Nichols et al. (1971) observed, the existence of non-labour income raises the 
possibility that wealthy retirees might choose outlets targeted to the poor.  Second, if 
resale of the target good is feasible, all potential separating equilibria created by the 
mechanism are vulnerable because the full price faced by the poor is less than that 
faced by the rich.  To prevent resale of the target good from poor to rich, the policy 
maker would need to purposefully raise the transactions costs of resale, either to low 
wage sellers or high wage buyers.  This could be achieved by personalizing the 
purchase of the good with purchaser details that require verification with use.   
Third, if the minimum queuing time for low wage individuals were substantial 
enough that the value of the target good to those individuals depreciated during the 
queue, the consumption of the rich would not exceed that of the poor in quantity, but 
it surely would in value.  Lastly, our proposal requires the policy maker to bear the 
expense and complexity of administering multiple outlets.  We note that real world 
target goods such as health care, public ferry tickets, hiking permits, postal services, 
and immigration processing offer at most a few price/time combinations.   
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Nonetheless, with judicious money pricing, even a few outlet choices will greatly 
diminish the disparity of income of individuals per outlet, and the inequality of 
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Appendix 1 
Proof of Existence and Uniqueness of a Separating Equilibrium  
Suppose the policy maker adopts proportional allocation across two outlets as in (9), 
and sets  L p at a ‘queuing’ outlet and  H p  at a ‘pricing’outlet according to 
**
,min () LL
* p pp ≤≤  and 
** * () H pH p pp ≤≤ such that H L p p ≠ , where 
** p  is defined by 
(11).   
 
We claim that any money price pair ( , ) LH p p as chosen above will result in the 
separation of high and low wage individuals to their respective outlets, and therefore a 
unique set of full prices
*
H
g w P , 
*
L
g w P and resulting allocation of 
*** ,, H HH yg l and 
*** ,, L LL yg l  and utilities. 
 
 
Suppose all the poor go to the queuing outlet and all the rich go to the pricing outlet.  
As was shown by the signing of the partial derivatives in (5) and (6), the equilibrium 
isoprice line of the rich must cut the equilibrium isoprice line of the poor from above.  
This is repeated for ease of reference in Fig. A.1 below. 
 




L H wH  +
*
H p  >
** *
L HL L wH p wH p += + % L                  (A.1) 
 
 
The inequality in (A.1) follows from hypothetically comparing the lower money 
price p %that would be needed to clear the pricing outlet with queuing time held at
*
H H  
if its inhabitants had their wage cut from wH to wL, all else controlled.  The equality in 
(A.1) follows because (
*





L p ).  Taken together, the two relations of (A.1) show that any low wage 
individual faces a higher full price by deviating from the queuing outlet. 
 
Similarly, if a single member of NH switched to the queuing outlet, he would face a 








H LH H wH p wH p += + %
H                  (A.2) 
 
 
Again, the inequality in (A.2) follows from hypothetically comparing the lower time 
priceH % that would be needed to clear the queuing outlet with money price fixed at 
*
L p  if its inhabitants had their wage raised from wL to wH, all else controlled.  The  
equality in (A.2) follows because (H %,
*
L p ) is on the same isoprice line for a high wage  
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H p ).  Taken together, the two relations of (A.2) show that any 
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Appendix 2 
 
Proof of the effect of an increase in wage disparity on the intersection of isoprice 
lines. 
 




, LM p ) as the 




, LH p ) as the intersection 
point of the wL and wH isoprice lines, and (
**
, M H H ,
**
, M H p ) as the intersection point of 
the wM and wH isoprice lines. 
 
Substituting out the common 
**
, LH p  for the wL and wH isoprice lines, 
 














w .     (A.2.1) 
 
This can be expanded to be expressed as 
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,, M HL HH < M , , (A.2.3) implies that 
** ** **
,, M HL HL HH H << M
,
, or that the wL isoprice line 
would cross the wH isoprice line before it crosses the wM isoprice line as is illustrated 
in Figs. A.2 and A.3 below.  Conversely, if 
** **
, M HL HH > M
,
,
, (A.2.3) would imply that 
, or that the w
** ** **
,, LM LH MH HHH << L isoprice line would cross the wM isoprice line 
before it crosses the wH isoprice line.     
 
We will show that
** **












, or the 
slope of the 
*









,, M HL HH < M . 
Totally differentiating the market clearing condition (4) with   defined as in (3), 
* g
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Fig. A.2  Feasible Range of Money Prices as wM increases to wH  (ρ>0) 
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Fig. A.3  Feasible Range of Money Prices as wM increases to wH  (ρ<0) 
 
 
It follows that 
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The denominator of (A.2.5) is positive.  The numerator is 
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33 3 2 3 4 33
22 2 11 11 11 11 11
11
gg g g PT PT PT P
ρρ
ρρ ρρ ρρ ρρ θθ θ
ρρ
−+
−− −− −− −− −−− −
−−
2 T θ    (A.2.6) 
 
(A.2.6) is negative for all values of ρ < 1. 
 
The fact that an increase in w  from wM to wH lowers  and raises 
** H
** p for positive or 
negative values of ρ, and moves the lower bound of the high wage isoprice line   
further to the south-west, together with the signs of (5) and (6), 
ensures that the potential range of money prices that can be set by the policy maker 
will increase. 
**
,max ,min (, HH Hp )
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(1 ) /
1 Clark and Kim (2005) compare social welfare under the ‘pay or wait’ mechanism with a proportional 
tax and uniform allocation system that also weakly achieves specific egalitarianism (SE).  This paper 
finds that SE may be achieved more efficiently under the pay or wait mechanism than tax and uniform 
provision as (i) the relative importance of the target good rises, (ii) the elasticity of substitution 
between goods falls, (iii) variation in preferences increases and (iv) income inequality rises or the 
proportion of the poor falls.       
 
2 Preferences are more general than in Alexeev and Leitzel (2001), who assume equal weight Cobb 
Douglas preferences between a single good and leisure.  We are less general, however, than 
O’Shaugnessy (2000), who assumes general concave utility over a single good and leisure. 
 
ρ = σσ −  , where σ  is the Allen elasticity of substitution between goods. 
3  More precisely, 
 
4 This assumes that individuals must queue once per unit purchased, and that everyone in a given outlet 
will wait an identical period of time per unit purchased.  This is a common reduced form way of 
modeling that queuing time increases with demand (Barzel, 1974; Sah, 1987; Suen, 1989; Polterovich, 
1993; O’Shaughnessy, 2000; and Alexeev and Leitzel, 2001).   Alternatives have been proposed, such 
as queuing time depending on show-up time (Holt and Sherman, 1982), or fixed time costs for any 
quantity of purchase (Weitzman, 1991). 
  
5 An alternative would be to extend the approach of Alexeev and Leitzel (2001), and assume 1) 
identical constant returns to scale production of y and g, 2) that workers are paid the value of their 
marginal product, and 3) that the government is the sole purchaser of all g produced.  This would result 
in a labour allocation between the two sectors that is under-identified, and would add little to our 
distributional results.  Readers interested in the efficiency aspects of a general equilibrium approach are 
referred to Clark and Kim (2005). 
 
6 Existence and uniqueness are satisfied in that the excess demand function (4) is monotonically 
decreasing in full price, takes on a negative value at an infinite price, and takes on an infinite value at 
zero price.  The same conditions are satisfied with multiple outlets and heterogeneous preferences later 
in the paper.  
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7 Wage differentials are exogenous here, but could reflect differences in worker marginal product.      
 
8   p  is similarly defined as the money price that would clear the outlet targeted to the poor with zero 
queuing.  
 
9  A detailed proof of this claim is given in Appendix 2.  It should be noted that at the borderline case of 
Cobb-Douglas elasticity of substitution (ρ = 0), an increase in wH would pivot the high wage isoprice 
line around an  pair fixed on the horizontal axis where 
** ** , Hp
** p = 0.  For the high wage group the 
range of possible money prices would still increase, but for the low wage group it would remain 
at()
** *
,min LL p pp <<
*
,max H H
.    
 
10 The authors are grateful to a referee for pointing out this potential problem.  
 
11 Setting time rather than money prices ensures that the money price at the pricing outlet can adjust to 
fully clear the outlet when demand there drops in response to the resale market.  Setting the time price 
at the pricing outlet specifically at zero avoids the problem of identifying the maximum possible value 
that ensures that low wage individuals would prefer the queuing to the pricing outlet at black 
market equilibrium.    
 
12  Weitzman (1977) adopts the more precise ideal of a distribution of the target good that would result 
if total actual income were equally distributed but tastes differed, in a market with pure pricing. 
 
13  That is, individuals with a stronger demand for g would desire to supply negative labour and 
“purchase g for a living” at a smaller per unit subsidy  p than individuals with a regular demand for g.  
Formally, with the full price of g constant, the partial derivative of
11
** 11




max min () g Pw H p =+
*
min
 with respect 
to θ is positive.  Since both θ types face the same , an increase in θ that raises 




H 14  If θ were replaced byθδ 1 , where 0 <δ <
*
L
, an individual will choose an outlet based not only on 
the lowest full price, but also the resulting value of the target good. This would re-enforce the rich in 
their choice of the pricing outlet, but provide a potential incentive for the poor to also switch to the 
pricing outlet if the resulting utility gain from the queuing time reduction exceeds the utility loss from 
the higher full price.  Preserving separation could require the policy maker to raise p so as to approach 
** * ** p from below, and/or lower H p  so as to approach  p  from above. 
 
15  The isoprice lines would intersect as shown in Fig. 4 from the same reasoning given in Appendix 2. 
Considering the bottom three wage groups, Appendix 2 shows that  , or that the w
** ** **
2,3 1,3 1,2 HHH <<
** ** ** ** **
3,4 2,4 2,3 1,3 1,2 HHHHH <<<<
1 
isoprice line would cross the w3 isoprice line before it crosses the w2 isoprice line. Applying the same 
reasoning to the top three wage groups and combining yields  . 
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